A commitment scheme allows one to commit to hidden information while keeping its value recoverable when needed. Despite considerable efforts, an unconditionally and perfectly secure bit commitment has been proven impossible both classically and quantum-mechanically. The situation is similar when committing to qubits instead of classical bits as implied in the no-masking theorem [K. Modi et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 120, 230501 (2018)]. In this Letter, we find that circumvention of the no-masking theorem is possible with the aid of classical randomness. Based on this, we construct an unconditionally secure quit-commitment scheme that utilises any kind of universal quantum maskers with optimal randomness consumption, which is distributed by a trusted initializer. This shows that randomness, which is normally considered only to obscure the information, can benefit a quantum secure communication scheme. This result can be generalised to an arbitrary dimensional system.
In a commitment protocol, a sender (say Alice) commits to a secret value in the way that a receiver (Bob) cannot access the value until it is revealed. On the other hand, Bob should be able to reject Alice's cheating of revealing a value different from the originally committed value. A commitment scheme, which has many cryptographical applications [1, 2] , is said to be unconditionally secure when the scheme does not depend on the computational power of both participants, while it is perfectly secure perfectly secure when the scheme works with zero probability of failure. However, an unconditionally and perfectly secure commitment protocol is impossible. If a commitment protocol is unconditionally and perfectly binding, which means that any attempt of Alice to change the already committed secret value can be detected by Bob, then there should be a unique secret value for each commitment provided by Alice to Bob. If so, the protocol, however, cannot be unconditionally and perfectly concealing, i.e., Bob could have some information about the committed value before Alice discloses it, because Bob with unlimited computational power can reveal the secret value by searching through every possible secret values and corresponding commitments.
Quantum bit-commitment is an attempt to circumvent this difficulty by using quantum mechanics [3] . However, it has been proven [4, 5] that an unconditionally secure commitment of a classical value is impossible even with the aid of quantum mechanics. Meanwhile, a fully classical breakthrough was developed by Rivest [6] as introducing a partially credible mediator, "trusted initializer," who is only involved in the beginning (setup) of the protocol and does not receive any information during the remaining protocols. In Ref. [6] , it was shown that the trusted initializer enables the construction of unconditionally secure commitment schemes for classical bits.
Recently it transpired that the situation is similar for qubit commitment, in which the commited secret value is a qubit. A result recently proven by Modi et al. [7] known as the no-masking theorem states that it is impossible to encode quantum information in a bipartite pure quantum state so that it is inaccessible to local subsystems. As a corollary, an unconditionally and perfectly secure qubit commitment is also forbidden [7] . It shows that qubit commitment schemes with straightforward protocols are vulnerable to entanglement-based attacks [7] .
One might expect that the no-masking theorem can be extended to mixed states similarly as the case of the nobroadcasting theorem [8] extended from the no-cloning theorem [9] . In this Letter, however, we show that this is not the case. We first prove a stronger version of the nomasking theorem by showing that one additionally needs at least log 2 d bits and 2 log 2 d bits of randomness respectively when entanglement is available and when only zero one-way quantum discord is allowed in the masked bipartite quantum state. We then introduce a simple way to circumvent the strengthened no-masking theorem by constructing explicit examples of quantum masker that consumes the minimal amount of randomness.
We further show that the class of universal quantum maskers that consume uniform randomness can be used for unconditionally secure qubit commitment schemes by introducing a trusted initializer, whose role is very similar to that of Rivest's commitment scheme. Our scheme has a security advantage over Rivest's scheme even when applied to the bit commitment as it avoids a certain type of security failure.
Quantum Masker.-According to Modi et al.'s definition [7] , masking quantum information is encoding quantum information in a composite quantum state with the information hidden from both the subsystems and remaining only in the quantum correlation between them. The technical definition in Ref. [7] only considers pure composite states so that the encoding of correlations are only allowed in the forms of entanglement. We note that, however, there are quantum correlations beyond entanglement [10, 12, 13] in the case of mixed states. A typical example would be the states with no entanglement but having non-zero quantum discord [14] . Therefore, we re- The condition on the existence of recovery, or unmasking map is crucial, since without it, a simple erasure map would qualify as a universal masker. Besides, the extension of universal masker to arbitrary mixed state input is natural, since, from the linearity of quantum channel, a masker that can mask every pure state can also mask arbitrary mixture of pure states. Therefore, every universal quantum masker Φ M is demanded to be an invertible quantum process. Such process can be always expressed [18] in terms of a quantum state ω S and a unitary transformation M which maps the input system C and the ancillary system S to the systems A and B such that
for every quantum state ρ with some ancillary state ω S . We will call the ancillary state ω S of a masking process as the safe state in the sense we put quantum information ρ into a secure safe. The no-masking theorem states that there is no universal masking process Φ M with a pure safe state. This raises a natural question : is it possible to mask quantum information with non-pure safe state?
It turns out that it is indeed possible and we introduce two examples. (Fig. 1 An interesting example of universal masker is the 3-qubit masker introduced in (b) of Fig. 1 . The 3-qubit masker does not form any entanglement and quantum discord with measurement on Bob's side for any input state, but still masks a qubit of quantum information. The systems B 1 and B 2 are in classical states, therefore they can be transmitted through a classical channel. The output state has, nonetheless, non-zero quantum discord with measurement on Alice's side for a generic input state.
We observe that a mixed safe state generated from an independent randomness source is required to mask quantum information. How much randomness is, however, required for a universal masker? Asking this question is appropriate given the recent trend in computer science and quantum information theory of treating randomness as a resource [11, 15, 16, 18] . We derive a lower bound on the randomness of the ancillary state ω S below. Theorem 1. Let ω S be the safe state of a universal quantum masker Φ M for a d-dimensional quantum system. Then, the von Neumann entropy of ω S is lower bounded by log 2 d.
We note that this theorem has the no-masking theorem as its corollary, since the no-masking theorem states that there are no universal quantum maskers that consume zero amount of randomness.
This lower bound of the randomness cost is, however, achievable only if entanglement between A and B for the masked state is allowed. This is because of the following trade-off relation between the strength of quantum correlation allowed between A and B and the randomness cost of quantum masking. Theorem 2. Let ω S be the safe state of a universal quantum masker Φ M for d-dimensional quantum system. If the masked state Φ M (ρ) for any ρ is separable, then the von Neumann entropy of ω S should be strictly larger than log 2 d. If the quantum discord D ← (A : B) of the masked state Φ M (ρ) for any state ρ vanishes, then the von Neumann entropy of ω S is at least 2 log 2 d.
This theorem shows that minimal randomness consumption of log 2 d bits is only possible with the aid of entanglement and any randomness cost saving from the 2 log 2 d bits bound comes from utilizing quantum discord in both directions. Theorems 1 and 2 and the examples of universal quantum maskers given in Fig. 1 show that these lower bounds are indeed minimal randomness costs that are achievable.
One may ask after Theorem 2 that if it is possible to mask quantum information without entanglement or any quantum correlations. The answer is that quantum correlations are a critical resource for masking quantum states, without which masking is impossible even with unbounded amount of randomness consumption.
Theorem 3. Universal quantum masking is impossible without quantum correlation.
Qubit-Commitment.--A typical commitment scheme consists of two protocols COMMIT and REVEAL involving two participants, Alice (sender) and Bob (receiver). In the COMMIT protocol, Alice commits her secret value to Bob, forbidding him from learning anything about it until she allows him to. Later, Alice discloses the secret value using the REVEAL protocol. Bob should be able to reject the revealed value if it is not consistent with the information provided in the COMMIT phase. This prevents Alice from pretending to have committed a value different from the one in the COMMIT phase. For the scheme to be secure, the following requirements are demanded:
Correctness : If every participant honestly follows the protocol, Bob will possess the value committed by Alice after the RE-VEAL protocol.
Concealing : Bob has no information about the committed value until the REVEAL protocol begins.
Binding : Once the COMMIT protocol is finished, any attempt by Alice to change the committed value should be rejected by Bob.
We say that a condition holds perfectly when the probability of the condition failure is zero. Even if the probability of failure is non-zero, if it is possible to make it arbitrarily small by increasing the security parameter, we still say that the security condition holds. All the requirements except the binding condition can be applied to qubit-commitment, or generally, quditcommitment schemes in which the value being committed is a quantum state. The binding condition can be appropriately modified to meet the inherent probabilistic characteristic of quantum mechanics. Assume that Alice commits her quantum state |ψ by directly giving it to Bob over a quantum channel, sacrificing the concealing requirement. Even in this case, Alice can insist that she has committed a quantum state |φ , which is nonorthogonal to |ψ , and still could be accepted by Bob with non-zero probability, | φ|ψ | 2 . Indeed the best fidelity achievable by Alice cannot be lower than this, since if a quantum qubit-commitment scheme allows lower best fidelity than this, then such scheme can be used to distinguish non-orthogonal states and thus breaks the no-cloning theorem or the information causality [23] . If Alice's best success probability of revealing the state |φ after committing the state ρ is exactly φ| ρ |φ , then we say that the scheme is perfectly quantum binding. If the best fidelity a scheme allows is not exactly φ| ρ |φ , but converges to it as the security parameter increases, i.e. the parameter that characterizes the security of the scheme such as the rank of the safe state increases, then the scheme is said quantum binding.
Now we propose an unconditionally secure quantum qubit commitment scheme that utilizes a universal quantum masker of a special kind. Consider a class of quantum maskers for which the safe state ω S is the maximally mixed state on its support. In other words, we consider the case of ω S = 1 r Π supp(ω S ) where r is the rank of ω S and Π T is the orthogonal projection operator onto a given subspace T . The 4-qubit masker and the 3-qubit masker introduced in this Letter are maskers of this class with ω S = |0 0| ⊗ |0 0| ⊗ 1, respectively. We then let |Ω SK be a purification of the state ω S , where the index S stands for the safe and K stands for the key. From a fixed purification |Ω SK , we can define ω K := Tr S |Ω Ω| SK and find an orthonormal basis
on the space supp(ω S ) ⊗ supp(ω K ) that consists of purifications of ω S , just like how the Bell basis is defined.
Let us introduce a "trusted initializer," Ted, who prepares a quantum state and classical information and distributes them to Alice and Bob at the beginning of the scheme. We trust Ted only to the extent that he cannot take advantage of the result of the commitment scheme because he never learns any information about the input state. Our scheme consists of three phases SETUP, COMMIT and REVEAL, and Ted participates only in the SETUP protocol and exits the scheme after that. (See Fig. 2.) SETUP : Ted prepares a bipartite state |Ω i SK randomly chosen from the an orthonormal basis {|Ω i SK } We provide the security proof of the qubit commitment protocol by the following theorem:
Theorem 4. The initializer qudit-commitment scheme is unconditionally and perfectly concealing and unconditionally quantum binding.
Details of the proof can be found in the Supplemental Material [22] . We highlight that an advantage of our scheme over Rivest's scheme is that it is perfectly concealing without 'collision error'. Rivest's scheme depends on the choice of a large prime number p and with the probability of 1/p, Alice's secret value and the evidence provided by Ted could coincide ('collide'), disclosing the secret value to Bob in the COMMIT protocol. In our scheme, however, regardless of Alice's choice of the secret qubit, Alice's secret qubit remains concealed until the REVEAL protocol begins. This fact enables the scheme proposed here to be applicable for low-dimensional cases in contrast with Rivest's scheme. Another interesting observation is that Alice's suboptimal strategy is to do nothing after the COMMIT protocol; the identity operation gives fidelity between the target state |φ and the originally committed state |ψ arbitrarily close to the optimal value as r → ∞. Moreover, any possible fidelity enhancement in bounded from above with (1 − | φ|ψ | 2 )/(1 + r 2 ) . In other words, our scheme fundamentally suppresses Alice's any kind of attempts to harm the binding requirement and successfully blocks the notorious entanglement attack [4, 5] .
The initializer scheme, however, inherits the problem of the Rivest scheme that it is not perfectly binding [6] . With the security parameter p for Rivest's scheme, Alice can guess the evidence given to Bob with the probability of 1/p 2 . In the scheme proposed here, the success probability of deceiving Bob about the index i of the safe and key state U |Ω i SK is generically non-zero and bounded from above with r 2 /(r 4 − 1). On the other hand, it is important to prevent Bob from having any access to the index i, otherwise Bob can infer the committed qubit by measuring the system SK with the knowledge of the state U |Ω i before the REVEAL protocol. This theorem justifies the introduction of the trusted third party in to the scheme, since even if Ted is malicious, it is impossible for Ted to attain any useful information about the secret value. A certain amount of trust is required, nevertheless, for collusion of Ted with either of participants leads to failure of security conditions.
In a practical situation, Alice may not know the specification of the state |ψ being committed, just as in quantum teleportation schemes. In this case, in the REVEAL protocol, Alice cannot disclose the state |ψ over a classical channel. For such cases, a scheme in which Bob's acceptance of Alice's revelation with high probability implies Bob's possession of a quantum state with high fidelity with the secret qubit of Alice would be favorable. We will say that such schemes have state-revealing property and we show here the existence of a scheme with such property. In this case, we only consider pure committed states for this property does not depend on the uncertainty of the input state, therefore one can assume the input state is in some fixed pure state just as in quantum teleportation schemes.
Theorem 6. The 3-qudit masker qudit commitment protocol with a trusted initializer has state-revealing property.
Discussion.-We have generalized the no-masking theorem suggested by Modi et al. [7] by introducing a new framework that interprets quantum masking as a task that consumes randomness in the process. In our formulation, the usage of randomness is catalytic in the sense introduced by Boes et al. [16] , since after applying unmasking unitary to the masked quantum state, the safe state is completely recovered and can be used again.
Our results show that there are subtle constraints for entanglement in tripartite quantum secret sharing schemes. Theorem 3 proves that it is impossible to share a quantum secret exploiting only genuine tripartite quantum entanglement. Meanwhile, Theorem 2 implies that there is a trade-off relation between the maximum quantum correlation between A and B and the randomness cost, i.e. the entanglement for the bipartition AB and C.
Quantum secret sharing scheme can be considered an isometric embedding of the space of a single party quantum state into the set of multipartite quantum states with fixed marginal states. Therefore the study of constraints and costs of quantum secret sharing scheme is important not only for practical applications but also for its potential as a tool to investigate quantum phenomena solely coming from quantum correlation by putting them in comparison with the well-understood properties of single-partite quantum states.
Recently, a qubit commitment scheme that can be implemented in fully classical communication with a fully classical receiver setting was suggested by Mahadev [26] , however, with a certain degree of assumption on the computational power. Since the scheme suggested in this Letter is unconditionally secure but requires quantum control capabilities on the receiver's side, a combination of both directions might yield a stronger result.
SHL is grateful to C.Oh and K.C. Tan Before proving this theorem we reprove a more general result for (k, n)−threshold quantum secret sharing schemes given in [27] in a way that doesn't rely on the strong subadditivity of the von Neumann entropy.
is the quantum map implementing a (k, n)−threshold quantum secret sharing scheme. Then, for any ρ ∈ S(C d ), the marginal state Φ M (ρ) Ai of any system obtained by tracing out the other n − 1 parties of the n-partite state Φ M (ρ) A1,...,An has the von Neumann entropy of log 2 d or higher.
Proof. As every (k, n)−threshold quantum secret sharing scheme can be purified to a pure (k, 2k − 1)-threshold quantum secret sharing scheme [17] , we only prove the lemma for that case. In that case, the scheme can be implemented with an isometry M :
Consider the input state ρ ∈ S(C d ) in the system C and its purification |Ψ ρ EC with the purification system E. Then the isometry M outputs the state (1 ⊗ M ) |Ψ ρ EC distributed among 2k parties E and A 1 , ...A 2k−1 . Let D be an authorized subset of the parties {A 1 , . . . , A 2k−1 } of the size k containing A i and U be the unauthorized subset {A 1 , . . . , A 2k−1 } \ D of the size k − 1. As a secret sharing scheme decouples any unauthorized set from environment, we have
where all the von Neumann entropies are defined for the output state (1 ⊗ M ) |Ψ ρ EC . Since (1 ⊗ M ) |Ψ ρ EC is a pure state we have
and from the subadditivity of the von Neumann entropy we have
where U := D \ {A i } is an unauthorized subset of {A 1 , . . . , A 2k−1 } of the size k − 1. Therefore,
Since the choice of the authorized set D was arbitrary barring the condition that it contains A i , one can choose the new D as {A i } U , which makes the new U , U . From the same argument we have
By averaging two inequalities we have
As the system E was defined as the purifying system of the input state ρ and remained intact through the secret sharing process, H(E) = H(ρ). As ρ was arbitrarily chosen, however, we can take H(E) as its maximum value log 2 d.
Note that this result can be considered a stronger version of Theorem 4 in [17] . By noting that a quantum masking process is merely a (2, 2)−threshold quantum secret sharing scheme and the fact that any mixed quantum secret sharing scheme can be obtained by tracing out irrelevant parties of a pure quantum secret sharing state, we can see that the following circuit represents an implementation of a pure (2, 3)−threshold quantnum secret sharing scheme among three parties, A, B and K.
Note that |Ψ ρ EC is a purification of the input state ρ and |Ω SK is a purification of the safe state ω S consumed in the hiding process. The lemma says that H(K) ≥ log 2 d, but as H(K) = H(ω S ) we have the proof of the theorem 1. Theorem 2. Let ω S be the safe state of a universal quantum masker Φ M for d-dimensional quantum system. If the masked state Φ M (ρ) for any ρ is separable, then the von Neumann entropy of ω S should be strictly larger than log 2 d. If the quantum discord D ← (A : B) of the masked state Φ M (ρ) for any state ρ vanishes, then the von Neumann entropy of ω S is at least 2 log 2 d.
Proof. Let's say Φ M (ρ) is separable for any pure state input ρ, then the fact following equality holds is evident from the definition of quantum discord.
S(K)
Here I(A : B) = S(A)+S(B)−S(AB) is the quantum mutual information betwenn A and B. However, as at least one of the pairs AK and BK should be entangled for some pure state ρ, because if all three pairs AB, AK and BK are separable, then the bipartite staet Φ M (ρ) AB should be classically correlated [28] , but because of Theorem 3 below, it is impossible to mask quantum information into classically correlated systems. Note that quantum discord D ← (A|K) is zero if and only if the system AK is in a quantum-classical state. Therefore for the given conditions, S(K) must be strictly larger than I(A : B), which is in turn no smaller than log 2 d. As S(S) = S(K), we get the first part of the theorem.
Since D ← (A : B) = 0, the state Φ M (|ψ ψ|) is a quantum-classical (QC) state [29] that has the form, where Tr A (Φ M (|ψ ψ|)) = i t i |σ i σ i | B is the spectral decomposition of the state of the system B independent of the state |ψ ψ|,
with some quantum state ρ i for each i. However, as
must have the same rank with the safe state ρ S . Therefore every ρ i must be a pure state, and we have
where for all i, |ψ i := M i |ψ for some operator M i with ψ| M †
AB→CS , the probability distribution {q i } has the same distribution with the eigenvalues of the safe state ω S . Now, whenever |ψ and |φ are mutually orthogonal states, we have Tr
This proves that M i is isometry for all i. Now, from the masking condition, the quantum channel
i is a randomization scheme [18] and therefore, from the result of the Ref. [18] , the Shannon entropy of the probability distribution {q i }, which is the von Neumann entorpy of the safe state ω S , is at least 2 log 2 d. 
where
and
For every d ≥ 2, tracing out B 1 B 2 system yields the maximally mixed state for the system A 1 A 2 and vice versa. For general mixed states, from the linearity of quantum processes, the marginal state of the output state will be a mixture of maximally mixed marginal states, which is again the maximally mixed state. This shows that the given quantum process can mask any quantum state. As to the recoverability condition, since this operation consists of unitary operation after the attachment of ancillary system, simple inverse unitary operation followed by tracing out of the ancillary systems recovers the input system. Theorem 4. Universal quantum masking is impossible without quantum correlation.
Proof. For a universal masking process Φ M , having no quantum correlation in the masked quantum state implies the following expression for any input state ρ C .
where p ij (ρ) is a joint probability distribution for indices i and j linear in the state ρ and {|i A } and {|j B } are respectively eigenbasis of Tr B [Φ M (ρ)] and Tr A [Φ M (ρ)] which are independent of the input state ρ. From the proof of Theorem 3, however, Φ M (|ψ ψ| C ) also permits the following expression for any input state |ψ .
This implies that p ij (|ψ ψ|) = q j for only one i and 0 otherwise and that p ij (|ψ ψ|) |i A = √ q j M j |ψ C . However the image of the right hand side of the equation with varying vector |ψ C is a d−dimensional subspace of H A , but the image of the left hand side is included in the union of the rays spanned by basis elements |i A . As the latter is strictly smaller than the former, we have contradiction.
Theorem 5. The initializer qudit-commitment scheme is unconditionally and perfectly concealing.
Proof. The quantum state U |Ω i Ω i | SK U † distributed by Ted to Alice and Bob in the SETUP protocol gets averaged to the maximally mixed state on the subspace supp(
, if one lacks the knowledge of the index i or the random unitary U . As the system S is in the state ω S for both parties in the beginning of the COMMIT protocol, the quantum masker successfully masks the input state, so the perfect concealing condition holds.
where dU is the Haar measure over the set of unitary operators V such that V |g = |g for all |g ∈ G ⊥ , Π T is the orthogonal projection operator onto a given subspace T , and F GG is the swapping operator between two subspaces G and G with
Note that if the unitary is only applied to a subsystem S then by modifying F → F S and Tr → Tr S we can substitute γ and δ with appropriate operator values. Then, by letting However, notice that this fidelity is an average fidelity over the Haar measrue dU . For a given unitary U on the system S and K, from the reverse Markov inequality, the probability of the fidelity between |ψ and the postmeasurement state larger than 1 − n is given as
Hence, by increasing the security parameter 1/ enough so that even for a large n, n becomes small, we have the high probability of high fidelity.
